<p>Unfortunately for Boeing, the Glenn L. Martin Co. was developing a similar aircraft with even better performance. The XB-907 was built, flown on 18 February 1932, and was chosen by the Army for production as the B-10. For the first time, the Air Corps had a modern bomber, miles ahead of contemporary fighters. Flat out, it could outrun them.
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<p>Air Corps fortunes received another boost in January 1931, in an agreement between General Douglas MacArthur, Army Chief of Staff, and Admiral William V. Pratt, Chief of Naval Operations. The Air Corps assumed the responsibility for the land-based air defense of the coastlines of the United States and of its possessions. That agreement finally gave the Air Corps a mission that was independent of ground forces and their control, and Air Corps leadership immediately tried to turn the agreement into a reason to create an independent air arm. In 1933, the Corps recommended the creation of a General Headquarters Air Force (GHQAF), with pursuit, attack and bombardment squadrons organized for coastal defense under Air Corps control. The concept was tested experimentally with the establishment of a Provisional GHQAF, organized specifically to concentrate the Air Corps on the West Coast for exercises in the late spring. It was the first opportunity to try out the idea, and it was also the first opportunity for the new Martin B-10 to show its capabilities. Both were the harbingers of greater things to come.
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<p>Project A, the Materiel Division's July 1933 study for a long-range bomber, showed that in theory a bomber could be designed to carry a ton of bombs for a distance of 5,000 miles (8,046 km) at a speed of 200 mph (322 km/h). The giant Boeing XB-15 was the direct result of the Project A concept. Unfortunately, it was ahead of its powerplants; aerodynamically and structurally, it taught the Air Corps a lot about big bombers.
